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NATO, CYBER DEFENSE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
David P. Fidler*
Richard Pregent**
Alex Vandurme***
INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity threats pose challenges to individuals,
corporations, states, and intergovernmental organizations. The
emergence of these threats also presents international cooperation
on security with difficult tasks. This essay analyzes how
cybersecurity threats affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), which is arguably the most important collective defense
alliance in the world.1 NATO has responded to the cyber threat in
policy and operational terms (Part I), but approaches and shifts in
cybersecurity policies create problems for NATO—problems that
NATO principles, practices, and politics exacerbate in ways that
will force NATO to address cyber threats more aggressively than it
has done so far (Part II). Whether NATO can adapt its approach
before a major cybersecurity crisis affects the Alliance’s ability to
carry out its missions effectively remains, at the present time, in
doubt.

* James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School
of Law; and Senior Fellow, Indiana University Center on Applied Cybersecurity
Research.
** Legal Advisor, NATO Allied Command Counterintelligence.
*** Head, Technical Center Engineering, NATO Computer Incident Response
Capability.
1
This essay integrates the three panel presentations focused on NATO at the St.
John’s University School of Law Symposium on “Cyberconflict: Threats,
Responses, and the Role of Law” held April 12, 2013, namely: “NATO Cyber
Defence: An Operational Perspective” (Alex Vandurme), “Cyber Operations
and Collective Self-Defense” (Richard Pregent), and “NATO, Cybersecurity,
and International Law” (David P. Fidler). The analysis and views in this essay
are individual perspectives and opinions only and do not represent the official
policies or positions of NATO or any NATO member.
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I. NATO AND NATO CYBER DEFENSE
A. NATO: History, Evolution, and Emergence of the Cyber
Threat2
Understanding NATO’s responses to cyber threats requires
some background in NATO’s history and evolution. Established in
1949, NATO emerged out of the geopolitical turmoil of the late
1940s that featured military and political threats from the Soviet
Union against Western European nations, many of which World
War II had devastated and left vulnerable to external attack,
foreign-sponsored subversion, or revival of nationalistic
militarism.3 The twelve founding NATO members created a
cooperative security organization premised on a commitment to
collective defense—an armed attack against any NATO member
would be an attack against all members, triggering the rights of
individual and collective self-defense under which NATO would
respond collectively to the attack, including, if necessary, with the
use of armed force.4
Once established, NATO became a core commitment and
institution in the West’s efforts to establish and maintain peace in
Western Europe and confront, compete with, deter, and, if
necessary, defeat the Soviet Union and its allies. NATO’s role in
the West’s strategy to defend against the Soviet threat required
building effective political decision-making processes and military
capabilities. Under the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO members
created the North Atlantic Council as the pre-eminent political
body and the military infrastructure necessary to implement
Council decisions and defend the Alliance from military threats
posed by the Soviet Union, and, after 1955, the Warsaw Pact.5
NATO expanded to include Greece and Turkey in 1952 and West
Germany in 1955 as key participants in its collective defense
efforts.

2

This section is based primarily on Richard Pregent’s Symposium presentation,
“Cyber Operations and Collective Self-Defense.”
3
See, e.g., NATO, A Short History of NATO, http://www.nato.int/history/natohistory.html (last visited June 13, 2013).
4
North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
5
Id. at art. 9.
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As an alliance of many countries, NATO operated on the
basis of fundamental principles and understandings. NATO’s
focus was on defending its members from military attack, which
meant that NATO did not function “out of area” despite the global
scale of the West’s competition with the Soviet bloc. Politically,
NATO made decisions on the basis of consensus, meaning all
members agreed on (or did not oppose) steps NATO needed to
take to meet its objectives. Making and implementing NATO
decisions often revealed political or legal constraints NATO
members had domestically that affected NATO policies. In terms
of military and other capabilities, NATO had what its members
provided in terms of funding, armed forces, and weaponry.
Despite challenges and crises during the Cold War, NATO
maintained its central role in the West’s confrontation with the
Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and the
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s presented NATO
with questions about its purpose in a post-Cold War world. Rather
than disband, NATO expanded its membership (now at 28
nations),6 began to engage in “out of area” security and military
operations (e.g., in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Libya), and started working more broadly with
non-NATO countries through partnerships. NATO also adapted to
address new security threats, such as international terrorism after
9/11, piracy off the Horn of Africa, and cyber attacks, especially
after the cyber attacks Estonia, a post-Cold War NATO member,
experienced in 2007.7
Although NATO’s evolution in the post-Cold War period
has involved NATO moving away from its classical collective selfdefense mission and into new geographical contexts and security
threats, the emergence of cybersecurity threats re-highlighted
NATO’s collective defense mission because of challenges to the
Alliance and its members created by societal, governmental, and
intergovernmental dependence on new information technologies,
especially the Internet. However, cyber threats constitute a
different collective defense problem than deterring Soviet tanks
from charging through the Fulda Gap.
6

NATO,
NATO
Member
Countries,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/nato_countries.htm (last updated Apr. 9, 2013).
7
On the Estonian cyber attacks, see ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA & LIIS VIHUL,
INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14−34 (2010).
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With the Internet’s global reach and the interconnectedness
of every NATO member with cyberspace, conceiving of cyber
threats to NATO as “in area” or “out of area” makes little sense.
In the cyber context, collective self-defense in NATO plays out on
a global scale vis-á-vis state and non-state actors. As described
below, NATO’s responses to the cyber threat have required
adapting the core mission of collective defense to a threat that
defies analogies to, or precedents from, NATO’s past.
B. NATO Cyber Defense: The Policy Commitment
Although the watershed moment for NATO cyber defense
was the cyber attacks Estonia suffered in 2007, NATO started to
address cyber threats before this event. During the Kosovo
operation in 1999, NATO members and military forces
experienced crude cyber attacks, involving denial of service
attacks and webpage defacements.8 These incidents did not
adversely affect NATO operations in Kosovo, but they occurred at
a time when political and military concerns about cybersecurity
were growing.9 In 2002, the NATO summit in Prague identified
the need for NATO to strengthen its capabilities to defend against
cyber attacks and established the Cyber Defence Program.10 This
Program created the NATO Computer Incident Response
Capability (NCIRC) in order to provide NATO with better
capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber threats.11 In
2005, NATO included the cyber threat in the Comprehensive
Political Guidance document12 and reinforced the need to protect
8

Jason Healey & Leendert van Bochoven, Atlantic Council, NATO’s Cyber
Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, at 2 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/natos-cybercapabilities-yesterday-today-and-tomorrow.
9
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., An Assessment of International Legal Issues in
Information Operations, at 5 (May 1999) (observing that “the proliferation of
global electronic communication systems and the increased interoperability of
computer equipment and operating systems . . . have made information systems
that are connected to any kind of network . . . vulnerable to computer network
attacks”).
10
NATO,
NATO
and
Cyber
Defence,
http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/topics_78170.htm? (last updated Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter
NATO and Cyber Defence].
11
Healey & Bochoven, supra note 8, at 2.
12
Id.

5

ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
& COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 4, No. 1

NATO information systems at the Riga summit,13 indicating that
NATO’s interest in cybersecurity reflected mounting worries about
social, political, and military vulnerabilities the deepening
dependence on cyberspace was creating.
Even though NATO started to respond to cyber threats
earlier, the cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 revealed the
inadequacy of NATO’s activities and sparked a significant scaling
up of NATO political commitment and operational capabilities in
this area. The Estonian incident helped bring the stakes of cyber
threats into sharper perspective for NATO.14 Cyber threats
presented challenges to NATO’s image and reputation, its ability
to ensure secure communications supporting military operations
conducted by the Alliance, its capabilities to function effectively
when cyberspace represents a new battlefield or domain of military
conflict, and the ability of NATO members to contribute to the
Alliance’s objectives and missions.
The increased policy commitment can be seen in the
outcome of the Bucharest summit in 2008, at which NATO
members noted their adoption of a Policy on Cyber Defence,
which stressed “the need for NATO and nations to protect key
information systems; to share best practices; and to provide a
capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber
attack.”15 NATO continued to give prominence to cyber defense
in its Strategic Concept16 adopted at the Lisbon summit (2010),17
13

NATO and Cyber Defence, supra note 10.
Stéphane Abrial, NATO Builds Its Cyberdefenses, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com-/2011/02/28/opinion/28iht-edabrial28.html?_r=1&#
(commander of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation observing that the
damage caused by the cyber attacks on Estonia “was a wake-up call for
NATO”).
15
NATO, Bucharest Summit Declaration para. 47 (Apr. 3, 2008),
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts-_8443.htm.
16
NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the
Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
at 16 (Nov. 2010), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/
20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf
[hereinafter
NATO
Strategic
Concept] (highlighting the need for NATO to “develop further our ability to
prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks”).
17
NATO, Lisbon Summit Declaration para. 2 (Nov. 20, 2010),
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_11/2010_11_11DE1DB9B
73C4F9BBFB52B2C94722EAC_PR_CP_2010_0155_ENGSummit_LISBON.pdf.
14
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the Cyber Defense Concept, Policy, and Action Plan (2011),18 and
the Chicago summit declaration (2012).19
Through these policy developments, NATO has
established, or encouraged the creation of, mechanisms to
implement, with the NCIRC, the strategy of improving cyber
defense within the Alliance and in NATO members, including the:
• Cyber Defence Management Board (CDMB), which is
the main NATO body overseeing NATO cyber defense
activities;20
• Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD
COE) in Tallinn, Estonia, as a research and educational
enterprise not formally part of NATO but supported by
NATO members that collaborates with NATO on cyber
defense issues;21
• Meetings of NATO Defence Ministers dedicated to cyber
defense;22 and
23
• Holding cyber defense exercises with NATO members.
NATO also integrated cyber defense into existing policy
processes. The Cyber Defence Concept, Policy, and Action Plan
of 2011 connects the cyber defense effort overseen by the CDMB
with the Defence Policy and Planning Committee in Reinforced
Format (DPPC(R)) established in 2010, which manages NATO’s
planning processes.24 NATO has also made more transparent the
18

NATO, Defending the Networks: The NATO Policy on Cyber Defence (2011),
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110914policy-cyberdefence.pdf [hereinafter NATO Policy on Cyber Defence].
19
NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration para. 49 (May 20, 2012),
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official-_texts_87593.htm?mode=
pressrelease.
20
NATO and Cyber Defence, supra note 10.
21
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,
https://www.ccdcoe.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2013).
22
NATO, Defence Ministers Make Progress on Cyber Protection,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news-_101143.htm (last updated Jun. 4,
2013).
23
NATO, Exercising Together Against Cyber Attacks, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/75747.htm (last updated Oct. 9, 2012).
24
NATO, The NATO Defence Planning Process, http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/SID-F7C21EDE-DEEA4EA7/natolive/topics_49202.htm (last updated
May 18, 2012).
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process through which NATO will make decisions on cyber threats
that might implicate collective defense under the North Atlantic
Treaty. In essence, NCIRC will notify the CDMB of threats it has
identified that might raise collective defense concerns, and CDMB
will inform and work with the DPPC(R) if threats warrant higherlevel involvement. The North Atlantic Council retains the
authority to declare whether a cyber attack constitutes an “armed
attack” under the North Atlantic Treaty. See Figure 1.
Figure 1. NATO Cyber Defense Governance

Source: NATO25

25

NATO Policy on Cyber Defence, supra note 18, at 1.
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C. NATO Cyber Defense: An Operational Perspective26
1. NATO’s cyber threat landscape
NCIRC is NATO’s main source of technical and
operational expertise and capabilities in cyber defense. It works to
protect NATO entities (e.g., NATO headquarters) and missions
(e.g., International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan) and to help NATO members address cybersecurity
threats to their information technology systems. The diversity of
these tasks creates different challenges for NCIRC. For example,
ensuring information security in NATO military operations
requires balancing operational needs for speed, secrecy, and
mobility with risk management, data security, and information
sharing—all tasks that characterize effective cybersecurity.
Working in other areas, such as protecting the everyday
functioning of NATO information systems from infiltration,
creates other demands on NCIRC.
NATO confronts a cyber threat landscape that involves
generic and specific threats NCIRC has to address. The generic
threats include malware, such as viruses and worms, that circulate
globally and are often designed by cyber criminals to steal
information or money. NATO systems encounter such malware,
even when it is not intentionally aimed at NATO or its personnel.
However, NATO is the target of a range of cyber intrusion
attempts, including those perpetrated by organized criminal
organizations, foreign governments engaging in cyber espionage,
and “hacktivists” opposed to NATO policies or activities. NATO
also has to deal with issues related to its personnel whose on-line
behaviors sometimes create risks for the integrity of NATO
information systems.
Cyber criminals and foreign governments target NATO
systems by using sophisticated email messages that appear credible
and authentic to the recipient. However, these emails include
“trojan horse” malware that—if activated by the recipient, for
example, by clicking on an attachment—attempts to gain access to
NATO computers, upload documents, collect information (e.g.,
passwords, network architecture), use infected computers to
26

This section is based on Alex Vandurme’s Symposium presentation on
“NATO Cyber Defence: An Operational Perspective.”
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compromise other machines and networks, and download more
malware (e.g., more advanced programs for exfiltrating
information). NATO is an espionage target for foreign
governments because of its importance as one of the world’s preeminent security alliances, and NATO makes a tempting target for
cyber criminals because, among other reasons, they can sell
information they steal from NATO to a range of willing buyers,
including governments.
The hacktivist threat to NATO has emerged more recently,
with hacktivism aimed at NATO becoming more prominent toward
the end of 2011 and continuing through 2012. Among the
hacktivists targeting NATO, perhaps the most well-known has
been Anonymous, a global, shadowy collection of like-minded
(and very smart) hackers who coordinate their activities for
maximum impact. Hacktivists seek publicity through damaging
NATO’s image and reputation, so NATO has experienced
webpage-defacement attacks, both successful and unsuccessful.
NATO also has to deal with cybersecurity problems created
by “insiders”—NATO personnel whose behaviors, both intentional
and unintentional, generate threats and risks to NATO information
systems. Targeted email attacks, as described above, rely on
recipients to click on attachments or other embedded code, and,
unfortunately, just like any other organization, NATO personnel
click on things they should not, which means NCIRC has to
address threats created by such actions. Even though NATO’s
systems for storing and sharing classified information are not
connected to the Internet, NCIRC has documented NATO
personnel attempting to transmit classified information by email
over the Internet—behavior that puts NATO security, and
sometimes NATO forces, at risk.
2. NCIRC’s approach to cyber defense
NCIRC addresses the cyber threats NATO faces through an
integrated approach that stresses prevention of threats, detection of
intrusions, response to incidents, recovery from infiltrations, and
applying lessons learned through feedback into prevention,
detection, response, and recovery strategies (Figure 2). In each
aspect of this approach, NCIRC continues to develop capabilities
and services to improve NATO’s cyber defense.
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Figure 2. NCIRC’s Methodology
Prevent	
  

Feedback	
  

Recover	
  

Detect	
  

Respond	
  

In terms of prevention, NCIRC emphasizes secure
engineering of information systems to “harden the target” in order
to reduce potential vulnerabilities—or the “attack surface”—and
provides continuous, NATO-wide anti-malware support. NCIRC
strengthens prevention through (1) assessing the vulnerability of
NATO systems, including penetration testing, as part of risk
assessment and management; and (2) improving NATO personnel
awareness through training, exercises, educational materials, and
notifications.
NCIRC monitors NATO systems to detect intrusions,
including checking emails for malware and web sites for
infiltrations. Detection leads to intrusion analysis to determine the
nature and scale of a threat and inform responses to it. NCIRC
continues to improve its ability to respond to cyber incidents,
including (1) expanding its currently limited 24/7 response
capability and computer forensic services; and (2) developing a
rapid reaction team to mobilize against serious incidents, such as
those Estonia experienced in 2007. NCIRC provides on-line and
on-site recovery support services and post-incident verification of
recovery in order to minimize the adverse effects of cyber
intrusions. Prevention, detection, response, and recovery activities
produce information NCIRC analyzes into order to develop and
share “lessons learned,” identify trends, and build a more informed
picture of NATO’s cyber defense efforts and security posture.
NCIRC’s operations demand extensive and intensive
collaboration within the Alliance (e.g., between NATO agencies

11
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and member nations) and with non-NATO partner countries,
intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the European Union),
national law enforcement authorities, private industry, and
academia.
Further, the more robust NCIRC’s operational
capabilities become, the more collaboration is critical for NATO
cyber defense.
II. NATO CYBER DEFENSE, CYBERSECURITY POLICY TRENDS,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW27
The establishment and strengthening of NCIRC’s
operational capabilities for cyber defense demonstrates that the
cyber threat to NATO is a clear, present, and growing danger. As
important as such capabilities are, NATO cyber defense takes
place in a context affected by policy and legal considerations. This
part of the essay analyzes NATO cyber defense efforts against
trends in cybersecurity policy and the legal implications of these
trends, especially the international legal implications. This
analysis situates NATO cyber defense in the broader context of
cybersecurity policy developments and international legal
challenges that policy makers face. The analysis also raises
questions about NATO cyber defense in the future, including
questions that identify obstacles to NATO’s ability to improve
cyber defense sufficiently in light of mounting cybersecurity
threats.
A. General Breakdown of Cybersecurity Policy Approaches
Stepping back from NATO, we need to acknowledge that
efforts to address cyber threats have created different policy
pathways. Three pathways have become prominent—the cyber
threat, cyber defense, and cyber technology approaches (Figure 3).
Although these approaches are not mutually exclusive, they are
distinct. Under the cyber threat approach, we classify a specific
cyber threat into traditional policy categories, namely armed
conflict, espionage, terrorism, or crime. These categories have
policy prescriptions and legal rules that we apply to the cyber
27

This part is based on David P. Fidler’s Symposium presentation on “NATO,
Cybersecurity, and International Law.”
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threat in question, and the categories are defined in ways that are
not technology specific.
Despite the prominence of the cyber threat approach,
concerns exist that it does not, and cannot, provide robust
cybersecurity. Classifying cyber threats into traditional categories
does little, the critique goes, for preventing attacks and building
resilience against attacks prevention activities do not stop. Instead,
the cyber defense approach counsels cybersecurity policy to
concentrate on defending against threats regardless of their source
or characterization under existing policy and legal categories. This
approach is an “all hazards” strategy advising prevention of threats
and resilience in responding to and recovering from threats that get
through. In other words, effective cybersecurity through prevention
and resilience does not depend on classifying a threat as an act of
war, espionage, terrorism, or crime or knowing a threat’s source.
However, the cyber defense approach faces criticism as
well, typically that an emphasis on defense is inadequate to deliver
sustainable cybersecurity. Cyber threats have developed to the
point where policy has to focus on not only defensive measures but
also capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat adversaries. This
emphasis on such full-spectrum capabilities characterizes the cyber
technology approach, which stresses that cybersecurity is
ultimately about having technological capabilities to defend
against, deter, and defeat cyber threats and those responsible for
them. Under this approach, technological capabilities for offensive
as well as defensive activities must form part of cybersecurity
policy.
Figure 3. Cybersecurity Policy Breakdown
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B. Cybersecurity Policy Approaches, International Law, and
NATO
1. NATO’s commitment to law and NATO’s legal ecosystem
NATO’s emphasis on cyber defense across its missions is
embedded within a broader Alliance commitment to legal
principles and the rule of law. NATO’s Strategic Concept
captured this sentiment in stating that NATO constitutes “a unique
community of values, committed to the principle of individual
liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” and that
NATO will act “[a]lways in accordance with international law.”28
Applied to cyber defense, this commitment to law means
that legal challenges NATO faces in this realm will be many and
complex. NATO faces these challenges in a complicated legal
ecosystem composed of national law, transnational law applicable
to NATO members which are European Union (EU) members, and
international law. NATO cyber defense activities have to navigate
this legal ecosystem to find approaches that produce legal
convergence or harmonization among NATO members. Strategies
that conflict with, or raise questions under, national, EU, or
international law will reveal—or create—legal divergence or
fragmentation within the Alliance. Given that cybersecurity
presents challenges to national, EU, and international law
regardless of NATO’s activities, legal issues are important features
of NATO’s efforts on cyber defense—a reality recognized by CCD
COE’s work on legal questions related to cybersecurity.29
2. Law and the cyber threat approach: Struggling with lex
lata
As described above, the cyber threat approach classifies
incidents into existing policy and legal categories, which means
that this approach operates on the basis of a significant body of
national and international law. The classification process involves,
first, determining whether a state or non-state actor perpetrated a
28

NATO Strategic Concept, supra note 16, at 6, 7.
NATO COOP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE,
https://www.ccdcoe.org/37.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
29

Focus

Areas,
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cyber incident and, second, slotting the incident into a specific
category that contains the policy and legal guidance for addressing
it (Figure 4). In terms of the first step, international legal
principles are important in assigning responsibility for cyber
incidents. The international law on state responsibility affects
whether and how a state victimized by a cyber attack can attribute
it to another state actor. For attribution and non-state actors,
international law on human rights includes principles that regulate
the application of criminal law against terrorists or ordinary
criminals.
The second step requires classifying an incident according
to long-standing policy and legal categories—for state actions,
armed conflict or espionage (both traditional and economic
espionage); for non-state actors, terrorism and crime. Each
category contains international law governing responses to
incidents that fall within it. For armed conflict, jus ad bellum and
jus in bello apply. International law is permissive with respect to
espionage, even when countries criminalize espionage in national
law. States have adopted treaties to address terrorism, and
international law includes both generic instruments on crime (e.g.,
extradition treaties; mutual legal assistance treaties) and treaties
addressing specific international crimes (e.g., torture, genocide,
crimes against humanity). Overall, the cyber threat approach
implicates a great deal of existing international law.
Figure 4. Cyber Threat Approach
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However, much of the international law implicated is not
specific to the cyber threat but involves “legacy rules” developed
before cybersecurity challenges emerged.30 The only category in
which cyber-specific international legal rules exist is in the
criminal realm, where, for example, the Council of Europe has
produced the Convention on Cybercrime.31 Cybersecurity policy
debates have addressed whether international legal rules not
specific to cyber threats are adequate or insufficient. In terms of
armed conflict, the recently published Tallinn Manual on
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare contributes to this
debate by systematically applying the existing law of armed
conflict to cyber means and methods of warfare.32
The
permissiveness of international law on espionage has come under
heightened scrutiny as the problem of economic cyber espionage
has escalated.33 Although no acts of cyber terrorism have
occurred, none of the existing anti-terrorism treaties would apply
effectively to such acts. For countries that are not state parties to
the Convention on Cybercrime, they can use more all-purpose
bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties to
cooperate on cyber crime, but using these treaties effectively
against cyber crime faces numerous difficulties.
More pointedly, whether the cyber threat approach,
including the laws it implicates, can support an effective strategy is
unclear. The approach is mainly a reactive one—a cyber incident
happens, it must be discovered and classified to identify what laws
apply, and then the applicable laws have to be implemented against
the perpetrators, assuming the incident can be technically
attributed to a specific actor in a manner that supports imposing
legal responsibility. The experience of the Convention on

30

Applying laws developed before the emergence of cyber threats to such
threats is also sometimes called applying “law by analogy.” See, e.g., Duncan B.
Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV, 1023, 1029 (2007) (questioning the “law-by-analogy
approach to government cyberoperations”).
31
Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, ETS No. 185, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167.
32
TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., Cambridge University Press 2013)
[hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
33
See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, DEF. SECURITY SERVICE, ADMINISTRATION
STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS 1 (2013).
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Cybercrime, which has only been ratified by 39 states,34 suggests
that moving from legacy rules to cyber-specific principles is not an
adequate response in a number of ways, including that it does not
change the reactive nature of the cyber threat approach or provide
effective deterrence against state and non-state use of cyber
technologies for various purposes.
Despite problems connected with the cyber threat approach,
it remains part of cybersecurity policy and law nationally and
internationally, even where the law applied consists only of legacy
rules. Thus, it is relevant for thinking about NATO cyber defense.
As a collective defense organization, how international law on
armed conflict applies to cyber threats is critical. The NATOaffiliated CCD COE facilitated the development of the Tallinn
Manual given the importance of these international legal
questions.35 Even though the Tallinn Manual is not an official
NATO document, statement of NATO policy, or the reflection of
any NATO member’s position, it will be a seminal analysis in
terms of how NATO and NATO members think about and apply
the international law on armed conflict to cyber means and
methods of warfare.
As described earlier, NATO is a target of foreign
governments engaging in cyber espionage, and NATO faces this
threat in a context in which international law does not prohibit or
restrict espionage activities. Does the threat of cyber espionage,
including economic cyber espionage, suggest that NATO and its
members should re-think the permissive nature of international law
on espionage? More specifically, how will NATO and NATO
members respond to U.S. diplomatic efforts to change attitudes and
practices on economic espionage in light of revelations of alleged
Chinese economic cyber espionage on a massive scale?36
Part of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution involved
addressing as an Alliance the threat of international terrorism,37

34

Convention on Cybercrime (June 13, 2013), C.E.T.S. 185,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm.
35
TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 32, at 1.
36
See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 33.
37
NATO, NATO and the Fight Against Terrorism, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/
SID-8E7AA87D-4AEBB4C6/natolive/76706.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2012).
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and NATO members have widely ratified anti-terrorism treaties.38
With mounting indications, especially from the United States,39
that counter-terrorism is beginning a transformation from the
policies that have characterized the post-9/11 world, NATO faces
questions about how it will coordinate its cyber defense activities
with its on-going (and probably shifting) counter-terrorism efforts.
What this transformation in counter-terrorism will be is still not
entirely clear, but it will probably involve addressing terrorist
activities less from an armed conflict approach and more from a
criminal and law enforcement strategy. Such a shift would connect
NATO cyber defense against cyber terrorism with cyber crime
strategies, triggering questions about how strongly NATO should
support international law on cybercrime (specifically the
Convention on Cybercrime) given doubts about its effectiveness.
More generally, how much NATO should be engaged in criminal
and law enforcement activities in the cyber realm is an issue when
NATO is, first and foremost, a collective defense organization.
3. Law and the cyber defense approach: Arguing about lex
ferenda
As described above, the perceived problems afflicting the
cyber threat approach have fed into support for the cyber defense
approach—the “all hazards” strategy to defend cyber infrastructure
and systems from attacks regardless of source or intent. NATO
experiences cyber intrusions perpetrated by both foreign
governments and cyber criminal organizations, often using the
same techniques (e.g., malware-infested emails). Foremost,
NATO needs to defend against this kind of threat no matter
whether a state or non-state actor is responsible. Thus, classifying
such attacks as espionage or crime is secondary to deterring or
mitigating such attacks and creating resilience against successful
infiltrations. Being fundamentally distinct in policy terms, the
38

For ratification status of these instruments, see United Nations Treaty
Collection, Text and Status of the United Nations Conventions on Terrorism,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/page2_en.xml.
39
See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National
Defense University (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
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cyber defense approach generates legal issues different from those
the cyber threat approach implicates.
Generally, the type of policy measures associated with
strengthening cyber defense tend to trigger questions about, or
tensions between, these measures and existing legal rules. This
pattern stimulates debates about what the law should be (lex
ferenda) to support more robust cyber defense rather than how
existing law (lex lata) should be applied to categorized cyber
threats. In other words, the cyber defense approach generally
supports changing law, where necessary, to reflect the challenges
presented by cyber threats. But, again, these changes seek to
bolster defensive strategies to prevent attacks and build resilience
rather than to make legacy rules in the reactive cyber threat
approach more specific to cyber threats. Opposition to these
changes is often embedded in fundamental principles of
international and national law, which pits support for these
principles against claims that cyber defense requires new rules or
new applications of existing principles.
Three strategies to strengthen cyber defenses illustrate this
dynamic. Strong cyber defense requires “situational awareness,”
meaning that (1) governments need to conduct more surveillance
of information systems to understand the pattern and nature of
cyber threats in circulation; and (2) state and non-state actors must
share more information more frequently in order to heighten the
public and private sectors’ understanding of threats and abilities to
defend against them. However, advocates of civil liberties, such as
the right to privacy, tend to oppose on constitutional and
international human rights grounds proposals to increase
governmental authority to conduct electronic surveillance40 and
increase information sharing between governments and nongovernmental entities.41
40

See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1138, 185 L. Ed. 2d. 264
(2013) (Supreme Court decision rejecting on standing grounds a challenge by
Amnesty International and others against the constitutionality of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act).
41
See, e.g., Michelle Richardson, CISPA: A Legislative Threat to Privacy and
Civilian Control of the Internet, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 4,
2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-and-liberty/cispaexplainer-1-what-information-can-be-shared (critical privacy analysis of a
legislative proposal in Congress that seeks to increase information sharing).

19

ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
& COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 4, No. 1

A second example involves the debate over protecting
critical infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector.
The strategy of improving cyber defenses requires encouraging or
mandating that the private sector improve its cybersecurity
practices, especially when private-sector enterprises control or
manage critical cyber infrastructure, critical infrastructure operated
through Internet applications, or critical infrastructure dependent
on the Internet to function. This requirement brings the question of
regulating the private sector for cybersecurity purposes into play,
and, as the United States has experienced, political disagreements
about such regulation have led to stalemate in the U.S. federal
legislature.42
As with proposals for improving situational
awareness, this fight is marked by disagreements about the
appropriate scope of governmental power and legal authority to
defend against cyber threats. International law does not contain
any rules or instruments on protecting critical infrastructure in the
cyber context, so the legal tensions arise from national legal
systems.
The third example focuses on proposals for cyber defense
to be active rather than just passive. What “active defense” means
is part of the debate about cyber defenses, and the concept means
different things to different people. Generally, “active” defenses
are distinguished from “passive” defenses in that “active”
measures extend beyond a defender’s own information systems to
identify, track, probe, infiltrate, or retaliate against the source of a
cyber intrusion. Included in discussions about active defenses are
tactics such as “trace back,” “hack back,” surveillance for
“situational awareness,” and “counter-strike.” Debates about
active defenses include arguments that such defenses deployed by
private entities could create problems under national criminal laws.
Active defenses could also generate worries that such defensive
activities could violate principles of sovereignty and nonintervention in international law.
NATO’s emphasis on cyber defense overlaps in important
ways with the thrust of the cyber defense approach. Table 1 lists
42

Michael S. Schmidt & Nicole Perlroth, Obama Order Gives Firms
Cyberthreat Information, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2013, at A16 (reporting on the
issuance by President Obama on an executive order on improving cybersecurity
for critical infrastructure as an alternative to Congress’ failure to pass legislation
addressing this issue).
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strategies often associated with improving cyber defenses and
describes aspects of NATO’s efforts that reflect these strategies.
This overlap does not mean NATO’s activities embrace more
controversial issues implicated by the cyber defense approach,
such as pursuing more intrusive government surveillance, more
regulation of private-sector critical infrastructure, and more
“forward-leaning” active defenses. However, because these
controversies are alive in NATO members and beyond, they will
affect NATO cyber defense efforts by, at the very least, raising
questions about what NATO does. For example, will NATO
members’ sensitivities about sovereignty keep NATO cyber
defense activities completely passive and reactive even as cyber
threats expand in scope, intensity, and sophistication? How will
strengthening NATO cyber defense deal with differences within
the Alliance about the privacy and other civil liberties in light of
the cyber threat? What impact will U.S. and EU debates about
improving private-sector cybersecurity have on NATO cyber
defense activities?
Table 1. NATO and the Cyber Defense Approach
Cyber Defense Strategy
Defend against any type of
cyber attack
Expand information
collection, retention,
sharing, and analysis

Extend reach of cyber
defense activities

Move from “passive” to
more “active” measures
Integrate cyber defense
with other defense
planning

NATO Cyber Defense Efforts
• Strengthen cyber defenses of NATO systems
against all kinds of cyber attacks (e.g., NCIRC)
• Improve information collection, analysis, and
sharing
• Better consultation, early warning, and
situational awareness
• Greater use of “open source” intelligence for
cyber defense
• Cover NATO military wing and NATO civilian
agencies
• Improve NATO member cyber defenses
• Work with the private sector in NATO members
on cyber defense
• Cooperate with non-NATO countries on cyber
defense
• Set requirements for non-NATO contributing
nations in crisis management mission
• NATO rapid response teams
• NATO “penetration” testing of its systems
• NATO awareness of technical, policy, and legal
debates about more “active” defenses
•

Integration of cyber defense into NATO Defence
Planning Process
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4. Law and the cyber technology approach: Harnessing cyber
capabilities
The cyber technology approach holds that the key to
cybersecurity is development of full-spectrum technological
capabilities to detect, deter, and defeat cyber threats. This focus on
capabilities rejects both the reactive categorization of the cyber
threat approach and the emphasis on defense in the cyber defense
approach. Further, the cyber technology approach believes that the
other two approaches are, in fact, dependent on technological
capabilities more than on policy prescriptions and legal principles.
For example, as described above, the cyber threat approach makes
attribution critical to assigning accountability under each threat
category, which constitutes a dilemma for this approach given the
difficulty of attribution in cyberspace. According to the cyber
technology approach, the only way to improve attribution is
through better, more powerful technological capabilities, not
through policy or legal maneuvering. Similarly, the ability to
defend against cyber threats through an “all hazards” strategy
requires cutting-edge technological capabilities to prevent,
monitor, detect, respond, and recover from cyber intrusions.
Moving from passive to active defenses also requires technological
prowess to achieve defensive objectives and minimize policy or
legal issues active defenses might raise.
The strategic objective of strengthening cybersecurity
through technology means law has different functions under this
approach, namely facilitating development of full-spectrum cyber
capabilities (e.g., through research and development programs and
cybersecurity workforce enhancement efforts) and regulating the
use of such capabilities. The development of more powerful and
versatile full-spectrum capabilities will put power into the hands of
government actors, and policy and legal issues will arise
concerning how such power is exercised. These issues can arise in
different contexts, including the risks of secrecy in using powerful
cyber technologies for law enforcement, intelligence, and military
purposes; constitutional tensions between executive and legislative
prerogatives in national security; and balance of power dynamics
in international relations. On these issues, international law either
does not exist (e.g., on developing new cyber capabilities,
regulating secrecy, or managing constitutional tensions) or is
perceived to be weak (e.g., controlling balance of power politics).
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As with the other approaches, the cyber technology
approach generates questions for NATO’s cyber defense strategy.
As the description of NCIRC above indicates, NATO cyber
defense requires operational capabilities, but, at the present time,
NATO members are not sharing their most advanced technologies
with NATO. How can NATO keep its defensive capabilities
relevant when offensive cyber means and methods continue to
advance? Can NATO’s cyber defense efforts be cutting-edge
without developing offensive capabilities?
Further, if NATO deployed more advanced technologies,
the level of secrecy about NATO cyber defense activities would
likely increase. How would such heightened secrecy affect NATO
and NATO members? Would more secrecy on cyber defense in
NATO generate backlash within constituencies in NATO members
or beyond?
Similarly, having access to more powerful
technological capabilities could elevate NATO’s role in the
cybersecurity dilemma emerging among the great powers in
international politics, especially as between the United States and
China. Will equipping NATO will more full-spectrum capabilities
fuel the “cyber arms race” that is already underway?
C. Cybersecurity Policy Shifting: Legal Implications and
Challenges for NATO43
In addition to identifying the cyber threat, defense, and
technology approaches as distinct policy pathways with different
legal implications for cybersecurity, analyzing whether policy
preferences are shifting in this realm is important, and, if so, what
consequences flow from such a shift. Our symposium panel
discussed a potential shift in policy away from the cyber threat
approach toward the cyber technology approach (Figure 5).
Although the cyber threat approach remains part of the mix,
problems with it have encouraged more policy interest in
improving cyber defenses. But, as described above, a cyber
defense emphasis produces awareness of the limitations of
defensive strategies and the attractiveness of developing fullspectrum capabilities—thus suggesting an increasing interest in a
43

In addition to Fidler’s Symposium presentation, this section draws on
Pregent’s presentation on “Cyber Operations and Collective Self-Defense.”
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capabilities focus. Such a shift has implications for the role of law
in cybersecurity because, as Figure 5 depicts, a shift from the cyber
threat approach, with its dense legal texture, to the cyber
technology approach, with its emphasis on capabilities, involves a
move from a strategy grounded in well-traveled legal categories
and concepts, to one premised more on the exercise of material
power in cyberspace.
Figure 5. Policy Shifts and NATO Cyber Defense

Concerning the three categories and the potential policy
shifting described above, NATO finds itself in a difficult situation
that, under current NATO practices, will be hard to escape. In
terms of the cyber threat, defense, and technology approaches,
NATO reflects behavior that puts the Alliance at a disadvantage.
NATO tends to be conservative in terms of legal issues, meaning
that the Alliance does not promise to be a fruitful forum for
adapting or revising legacy rules to reflect the particular challenges
cyber poses.
Similarly, with NATO operating on the basis of consensus,
the Alliance’s decision-making processes might have difficulty
handling governance questions created by the cyber defense
approach, such as how “active” should NATO cyber defense be.
Operationally, NATO cyber defense appears more static and
reactive than active in orientation—a situation that could lead
NATO cyber defense to become a cyber “Maginot line” rather than
an effective defensive strategy. It is not clear whether NATO
members could reach consensus on what more active cyber
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defense activities would be permissible under international legal
principles on sovereignty and non-intervention.
As noted earlier, NATO functions with the capabilities its
members make available to it, meaning that NATO’s technological
capabilities in cyber might not reach cutting-edge status, leaving
NATO cyber defense behind the global technological curve in
cyberspace. This problem is exacerbated if policy makers in
leading powers, such as the United States and China, are placing
more reliance on developing, deploying, and using full-spectrum
cyber technological capabilities because of the perceived pitfalls of
other approaches and the mounting geopolitical competition now
affecting cyberspace.
NATO members are also extraordinarily sensitive to the
Alliance having any offensive cyber capabilities or even discussing
the need to think about the value of cyber capabilities and
operations in missions NATO might undertake (as NATO has done
with other technological developments affecting its military
missions).44 The North Atlantic Council has not discussed, let
alone authorized, the development of offensive capabilities,
doctrine, or rules of engagement in the cyber realm.45 Whether
NATO members could agree on what offensive cyber operations
international law would permit is also not clear, especially in light
of difficulties cyber presents to the international law on armed
conflict revealed by the Tallinn Manual and other analyses.46
Events outside the specific context of NATO cyber defense
might also adversely affect NATO cooperation. For example, in
June 2013, negative European reactions to the disclosure of a
44

For proposals for how NATO could address offensive cyber operations, see
Healey & Bochoven, supra note 8, at 8 (recommending that NATO should
consider coordination of NATO members’ offensive cyber operations and
“creating a group modeled on NATO’s existing Nuclear Planning Group, to
consider offensive cyber policy”).
45
NATO’s standing rules of engagement (ROE) might theoretically provide a
basis for NATO offensive cyber operations under the ROE for information
operations, but reliance on such ROE for offensive cyber operations is very
unlikely given existing NATO sensitivities about offensive cyber issues. On
NATO ROE generally, see NATO, NATO LEGAL DESKBOOK 254–62. (2d. ed.,
2010).
46
NATO’s reluctance to address offensive cyber operations does not mean that
the law of armed conflict prohibits such operations generally or in specific
contexts where such operations might be militarily advantageous or ethically
preferable.
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secret U.S. surveillance program targeting cyber activities of
foreign nationals, code-named PRISM, reflected new transAtlantic tensions on government surveillance in cyberspace, its
implications for privacy and other civil liberties, and the potential
for European-American cooperation on cybersecurity.
The
Washington Post reported that “[t]he discontent from Europe
pointed to the breadth of fallout from the affair and to the potential
for fresh strains between the United States and allies wary of
American intrusiveness.”47 Whatever the long-term impact of this
political fallout, the short-term consequences will likely not create
more willingness among NATO members to become more
ambitious with NATO cyber defense.
CONCLUSION
In its sixty-four year history, NATO has been at the center
of national security challenges faced by members of the Alliance,
whether the challenge involved confronting Soviet military power
in Europe, expanding its collective defense strategy in the postCold War period, responding to humanitarian crises, or
participating in efforts to address international terrorism. NATO’s
cyber defense strategy means that the Alliance has started to deal
with yet another security threat, spurred in particular by the
Estonia cyber crisis. However, despite the progress NATO has
made with its operational capabilities through NCIRC and its
decision-making processes on cyber defense issues, NATO is not,
at present, at the center of cybersecurity thinking taking place
within the policy circles in NATO members, especially the United
States. The more NATO lags behind in cybersecurity policy and
law, the more the Alliance will be stuck in a reactive mode—a
situation that will reduce NATO’s ability to be a more constructive
platform for cybersecurity both within the Alliance and between
NATO and non-NATO countries. NATO could proactively play a
more significant role in global cybersecurity but only if NATO
members empower NATO to lead rather than just trail behind.
47

Michael Birnbaum, Merkel, Other European Leaders Raise Concerns on U.S.
Surveillance, WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/merkel-other-european-leaders-raise-concerns-on-us-surveillance/2013/
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